

Theorizing and The elaboration of Place: Inquiry into Galileo and Freud

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Dwelling and the Site of Theorizing

It is clear that any thought that proposes to rethink the relationship between soul and body or between idea and matter must also at the same time rethink the relationship between the person and his place of dwelling. A new understanding that refuses to view the body as a piece of equipment animated by a sovereign soul can thereby neither support the belief that a place of dwelling is but a *machine a vivre* (Le Corbusier), or that a house or a city is but a kind of material framework or container that indifferently holds its human cargo. Any thought concerning the body affects our understanding of the home, the office, the hospital, the laboratorium and the city itself. All of these places of inhabitation come to share in the mystery which is the mystery of the *body*. An understanding of inhabiting becomes inseparable from an understanding of incorporation.

At the beginning of *Being and Time* Heidegger (1962) poses the question as to the meaning of the "being-in" of human "being-in-the-world." Normally we understand the preposition "in" to give us the relationship of position of two entities. Understood this way we can read continuously and without the shock of transition the phrases: "the cheese is *in* the cupboard," "the wine is *in* the flask," "the soul is *in* the body," "the body is *in* the world," "the person is *in* the house."

To read these phrases continuously and without the awareness of a radical shift in meaning of the word "in" means to erase the difference between things and people. Implicitly it means to view the human body as a container, to see houses as a kind of crate, and cities as a kind of storage place. It means to pave the way for a certain kind of medicine, a certain kind of architecture and city planning, and a certain kind of psychology and theology. In Heidegger's (1962) reading of Grimm's etymological study on *In* and *In und Bei* in the *Kleinere Schriften* the "in" as it is used in the phrase being-in-the-world derives from the archaic verb *innan*, meaning "to reside," "to dwell." Grimm had noted that a number of ancient German words for "house" and "dwelling" had a form similar to the English "inn." Middle English and Anglo-Saxon forms of *inn* referred originally to a house or a chamber and only gradually acquired the more specialized meaning of hotel, restaurant, or tavern. English still maintains an intransitive and transitive verb form of *inn*, meaning "to take up lodging" and "to house," "to lodge." A first approximate reading of being-in-the-world would give us "to take up lodging (in) the world," "to dwell or to inhabit the world." The *an* of *innan* in turn means in Heidegger's reading "I am accustomed to" and "I am familiar with."

The English *inhabiting* equally gives us the active dwelling, busying ourselves to make ourselves at home, together with what is gained in this active doing, namely the trusted familiarity of the *habitual*. If we then translate the *in* of "being-in-the-world" by *innan* and if we then approximate *innan* by *inhabiting*, we come to read the phrase "being-in-the-world" as "to be inhabiting the world." Moreover, the verb "to be" in the German first person singular gives *usIch bin*, where *bin* shows a relationship to

the German *bei* in such a manner that *Ich bin* can be read by Heidegger as "I reside alongside," "I am familiar with," "I inhabit." The phrase being-in-the-world when interpreted in this manner reiterates the primordially of dwelling. Dwelling no longer is seen as an elaboration upon a more fundamental theme of place and space but, on the contrary, becomes itself the fundamental human activity, in the light of which both place and space find their first clarification. It is in the dawn of dwelling that a first "place" comes into view, that a first thematization of space can come into being. Neither the house nor the cave nor the anatomical body can be pointed to in this context as an inert place awaiting before time to be inhabited by a soul or a person. It is only on the basis of dwelling that the cheese can be in the cupboard, that the wine can be in the flask, that the cave can be in the mountain, or that the person can be at home. All positions and locations refer us back to a fundamental manner of being-in-the-world, which must be understood as dwelling.

If we take to heart this understanding of dwelling, then our perception of the place of dwelling appears changed. The home, the factory, the hospital, the laboratory, the city no longer appear in the first place as finished material things, as containers of people and their activities; rather these buildings themselves make their appearance as a certain embodied grasp on the world, as possible human stances, as particular manners of taking up the body and the world, as specific orientations disclosing certain aspects of a worldly horizon. The first architecture then appears to be that of taking up a particular bodily attitude. Architecture is then at first a certain manner of standing or sitting, or lying down or walking.

The first logs, the first bricks are the trained limbs of agile bodies; the first

foundations of the first building is a series of domesticated movements, of spontaneous bodily actions mastered in habit. Building is at first ritualized, routinized movement that allows a particular access to the world. The earliest usages of the word in the form of the Anglo-Saxon *boon* gives us not the making of a finished thing but the living of a domesticated life. Before becoming a "constructing" in the modern sense, *boon* refers to dwelling and cultivating, to a remaining and caring, resulting in growth and increase (*phuomai*). We still find the imprint of this ancient usage in the German *Bauer* for farmer, in the Dutch *landbouw* for agriculture, and in our own *neighbor* which could be paraphrased as "he who dwells nearby."

In this view architecture is a planning and building, which codifies and solidifies a certain manner of "remaining nearby," of dwelling or inhabiting. It follows the lead of the body, the accomplishment of habit and of stance. It is only by thus taking up the melody of the body that architecture in its turn comes to influence the body, comes to accentuate a certain series of bodily possibilities within a certain type of room or building or city, while it relegates at the same time other possibilities to the background. Thus it might be possible to organize a successful dinner party in a chemical laboratory or to have an intimate conversation with someone in an airport, but in order to do so we must remain constantly detached from, or even in active opposition to, our architectural environment.

Like an accomplished choreography, a building shapes our movements and leads us to a certain outlook or assures us a certain grasp. A building is a codified dance, an insistent invitation to live our bodily being in a certain manner. And we respond to this invitation by taking up a certain

rhythm of walking and breathing, of digesting and thinking and feeling.

To enter a building, to come under the sway of certain choreography, means at the same time to become subject to a certain disclosure. Like a certain bodily attitude, a building opens a particular world of tasks, of outlooks, of sensibilities. The windows guide and frame our outwardly directed glance; they may offer us the possibility of seizing a majestic surrounding landscape, or they may gently place before us a secret spot of nature: an inner court, a protected pond, a tender little garden. When I enter a house and surrender myself to the pre reflective promptings that issue from the building I come to assume the required stance, and suddenly there lies spread out before me and all around me a new world. In this intimate alliance with the body the building itself has become a particular access to the world. I no longer am contained within a thing like construction, no longer remain within the building as one thing enclosed within another; rather I have drawn this building into the sphere of my body. I have appropriated it and have drawn it around me like a coat on a windy day to inspect a certain sight or to face a particular task.

The architect, Norberg-Schulz (1971), in his informative work on *Existence, Space and Architecture*, quotes from a conversation with an Italian woman who was asked to describe her village to someone who had never seen it before and who began: "My village is like a warm coat that I put on . . ." (p. 30). Inhabiting is closely allied to wearing something, as indeed the French *s'habiller* for dressing would suggest and as we can see confirmed in Latin where *habeo* gives us equally "I have," "I wear," "I inhabit."

If, with Merleau-Ponty (1962), we can come to approach *having* as "the relation which the subject bears to the term into which he projects himself" (p. 174), then we can come

to understand *inhabitation* under the aspect of *habit* as indeed the "wearing" of a series of domesticated movements woven together under the impact of a unifying intention. And we equally can approach inhabitation as the *wearing* of something, as the drawing toward and around ourselves of a coat, a house, a city. Ultimately inhabitation refers us to a primordial donation - to a manner of *having* a body, a habit, a language, an idea, a coat, a house, a city - so that it opens up a world.

To take up this thought in a serious manner, to live it through in its consequences, means that it no longer will be possible to think within an idealist tradition of human essences, vital principles, souls or thinking substances as self-enclosed - self-sufficient principles that have their being apart from dwelling. It becomes impossible or even contradictory to think of a human essence prior or posterior to dwelling. Nor can we in the light of this understanding, approach the earth, the cave, the body, the sheltering place within a materialist tradition as something that has its being apart from inhabitation, as something anterior and posterior to dwelling. Body and soul, earth and people, cave and inhabitants make their appearance only as unities of mutual implication, as poles of an indissoluble unity of reciprocal reference.

If we build on this basis, we might ask ourselves how we might understand theoretical effort in a new way. Within this new context, theorizing clearly no longer can be approached idealistically as an immaterial flight of ideas; nor can it be understood materialistically as an epiphenomenon of material interactions. Instead, theorizing now demands to be understood as a manner of living a concrete life, as a form of incorporation and inhabitation, as a way of living in and through habits, things, places. Theorizing no longer can aspire to reach an earth prior to inhabitation; nor can it aspire

to reveal to us a humanity that is neither housed nor embodied. It no longer can reach essences and material substances that antedate dwelling, it can no longer think past or prior to dwelling; it must instead transform itself into "a thinking for the sake of dwelling" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 161).

Origins of the Theoretic Journey

The earliest mention of theoretical labors reaches us from the sixth century B.C. through the poetry of Theognis of Megara, who speaks of a theoretician not as an abstract thinker but as a delegate sent by his people to a distant town to represent them at the time of a religious celebration (Koller, 1958). Plato speaks in the same vein of a traditional *theoria* at the beginning of *Phaedo* as an official journey undertaken to visit a distant shrine. Theorizing made its first appearance as *an arduous journey to a place of divine manifestation in the service of a community*. It required first of all a leaving behind of the familiar and comforting sounds and sights of habitual life and the acceptance of the discipline imposed by the requirements of a strenuous voyage. Once the theorist had achieved the object of his journey, had made the required sacrifices and participated in the prescribed processions, dances or games, he faced *the task of finding and following the path that would lead him from the festive heights back to the plane of everyday existence*, which he shared with his fellow citizens. *Only such a return would complete the task* of the theorist and connect the distant shrine to the native city, would link up the festive events of a faraway place to the everyday concerns nearby.

The return of the theorist to his native city would be the original labor of interpretation

and integration that situates what is distant in respect to what is near and what is festive in respect to what is mundane. Interpretation in this original sense of a return to the native city would therefore not be a mere indifferent play of cleverness or of vain skills but rather would at first make its appearance as an embodied struggle with the real hardships of lonely mountain roads or heavy seas; it would connect the beginning and the end of a fateful journey by means of bodily resourcefulness and physical endurance.

Theorizing

was from the beginning never a mere shadow play of concepts; of disembodied ideas used in a game of empty possibilities. It was rather from the start a commerce with the distance, a desire to reach out

beyond the comforts of mundane life toward the distant, festive realm. And it was also a desire to return from the distance to the comfortable dwelling place to infect that realm of the functional and the habitual with a spark of the festive.

Theorizing therefore should never be understood as a mere exodus, as liberation from conventional restraints, or as imagination of the impossible. Whenever it does not deteriorate into a destructive escapism or mere fantasy, theorizing returns to the home-country, the polis, the domestic realm, that is, to the very instrument of vision, on the basis of which alone anything at all can come into view or within reach. Civilization itself is this exchange with an external world, which has both its beginning and its end in the polis. The first temples can be imagined as places of hospitality where the horizons of a larger world are drawn inward, where the widely roaming powers, spirits, and gods are invited to come in and settle. The polis is itself a great collector of a surrounding world; it is a place of concentration, a magnet that orients and draws toward itself

whatever passes, near or far.

Theorizing belongs within this pattern of civilization and as such moves of necessity from the revealing distance back toward the home base. Only with the decline of the polis, of the home base, will theorizing gradually come to lose its way and end as aimless wandering in the wilderness. All theoretical effort is held together by the attraction of the homeland of the theorist, by the welcome of a civilized audience. Theorizing does not spring from the head or mind of a solitary citizen. On the contrary, it constitutes a civilizing movement in which every inhabitant of the polis plays a role. *Great theoretic effort remains in essence a communal greeting and welcoming of the distance within the heart of a great polis.*

If we view theorizing within this ancient and originary context and, from that perspective, approach modern forms of theorizing, we still can observe this same pattern of movement between a home-base and a distant place of privileged contact with the real. Even today, theoretical effort moves us from the home base toward the research institute, the library, the university, the laboratory, and back. We moderns repeat the mission to Delos; we sing the same song with different accents and in a different key. We still are drawn toward theoretical effort as we are attracted to an adventurous journey, to a distant place or a foreign tongue. We still hope that our theoretical labors will yield a fresh view of the things and events that surround us. We still move away from what is known and trustingly familiar to experience it upon our return in a new way. We still expect to draw closer to our intimate surroundings by moving away and returning. We still hope to bring new life to our city; we still seek to infuse our habits with new significance. Such infusion and such hope of renewal continue to maintain a

link, no matter how tenuous, with our ancient past.

Place and Theoretic Journey

If we now want to move closer to an understanding of the privileged sites of theorizing - that is, to the successors to the ancient places and times of celebration and worship - we find some support in a suggestive article by Jenkins (1973), who draws our attention to the age-old persistent habits of historians of philosophy to mention the *places* associated with a particular theoretical effort. Zeno remains thus in our remembrance, forever associated with a porch; Thales, with a well; and Epicurus, with a garden. Plato remains in our memory attached to the academy and perhaps to the court at Syracuse. Kant and Hegel are the first philosophers to occupy academic chairs; Leibniz did much of his work in a ducal library. Each is associated with a particular place from which he spoke. Each perhaps also must be thought of as associated with a distant shrine or temple, with some privileged site from where they returned to the city. Of Socrates, for example, it is said that he practiced his philosophy in the marketplace and at the home of friends in the form of after-dinner conversations. But we should not forget that before his appearance at (Plato's) symposium he withdrew within the dark porch of a neighbor's house, where he stood motionless and lost in thought before making his appearance, half way through dinner, at Agathon's party. Perhaps Plato equally drew from the same well of silence and estrangement before he wrote or lectured to his students.

Descartes similarly withdrew to the little stove-heated room in the dead of the German winter. There he touched the limits of his world before making his eloquent entry into the centers of learning and civilization of his day. And should we not approach Nietzsche's

and Kierkegaard's unclarified social situation in a similar way? Should we not understand their alienation from the university and the church as a similar retreat into unchartered territory, as a withdrawal to the very limits of the civilized world to be able to return precisely to the heart of that world and to pierce it to its core? Might we view our modern laboratories and research institutes and the university, to the extent that they still bear life within themselves, as places of alienation, as successors to distant shrines, porches, and temples, where we go into seclusion to find access to the very life around us and within us?

It is not hard to see that each age constructs its own temples, its own places of privileged contact with the real. At times such a shift becomes visible at the very moment when it is being enacted. Perhaps we are able to read such a significant shift in the strange sentence ascribed to Socrates at the beginning of Plato's *Symposium* in which he expresses his reluctance to attend a public religious celebration while at the same time expressing his eagerness to participate in the private celebrations at Agathon's house. "I kept away from the public celebrations because I was afraid there'd be a crush" (174, a), Socrates is made to say. But perhaps it is only within a shift from theater to philosophy, from public religious celebrations to private philosophical discussions, that the larger gatherings now appear as crowded and perhaps oppressive. In Plato we observe the subtle shift from one place of privileged contact with the real to that of another. Here we move from the crowded theater and the public celebration to the intimate space of a country estate and from there to the library, the gardens, and the lecture hall of the Academy. A new public and a new form of involvement with each other and with a larger world thus have emerged and crystallized. A new manner of performance and a

different scale of excellence, of expression and insight, have come into being. The first outlines of a university appear against the background of a fading theater.

The Laboratory as Summit of the Theoretic Journey

Another such shift can be illustrated by the charming tale of how Galileo came to discover the principle of isochronisms of the pendulum. It relates how the young Galileo was led to his discovery while observing a swinging chandelier above his pew in the Cathedral of his native Pisa. He is said to have noticed how the time needed for the chandelier to complete its swing from one end to the other remained constant, even though the amplitude of the swing gradually decreased over time. He verified this impression by measuring the time needed for each swing by counting the beats of his pulse. Afterwards he is said to have conducted experiments in which he replaced the complex chandeliers by a simple pendulum. Thus he laid the foundation for the invention of the pendulum clock.

This popular and persistent account of Galileo's natural scientific observations in the Cathedral of Pisa has survived the centuries and can be traced back to the last known disciple of the master, Vincenzo Viviani, who wrote his famous account of the event at least half a century after it supposedly took place. Some recent historical investigations have cast doubt on the exact details of Viviani's story. The chandelier of which he makes mention appears to have been installed four years after the time indicated for Galileo's discovery (Koyre, 1943). Did he perhaps derive his inspiration in another church or from another object? Is it possible that he might have recalled the incident in a distorted fashion in his later years and transmitted it in this form to his young pupil who was to

become his biographer? Yet, whatever may be the relationship of this tale to certain factual historical details, we are in no case prevented from treating it with all due respect as a mythic tale that speaks in its own manner concerning the origins of modern physical science.

If we approach the tale as myth and seek to disclose its meaning, we must begin by becoming aware how it speaks covertly of a strange and violent shift in perspective. We enter a magnificent cathedral perhaps at the moment when preparations are being made for a religious service. A sexton hurries through the church lighting the chandeliers. He lowers them by means of a pulley, lights them, and then draws them up again to their former position. The chandeliers move to and fro while they sweep the church with broad irregular streaks of light. A thoughtful young man in his pew observes the proceedings. But then suddenly, the tale plunges us in the midst of a laboratory where a scientist observes the motions of physical objects. We move from the space of the cathedral to another domain far removed from it, and we ourselves thereby participate in the revolution brought about by the perspective of the physical sciences within a religious universe. At this point we are invited to become aware of the tremendous labor of exclusion and transformation that is needed to metamorphose the magnificent chandeliers belonging to the sphere of the cathedral into objects of scientific observation belonging to the realm of the laboratory. This metamorphosis implies the deconstruction of the sacred space, of a place of religious worship and its reconstruction into the functional space of the laboratory. To transform the swinging chandeliers into pure *Pendulums* - that is. into abstract hanging things moving according to a natural lawfulness in physical space - Galileo would first have to sever

his habitual relations to his familiar environment. He would have to de-inhabit, to dis-embodiment this richly meaningful' place of worship. He would have to exile himself from the cathedral and all it had meant to him. In this exile the religious space would reappear stripped of its central and unifying theme, which up to that time had held all the different aspects of the building together within a common meaning. These aspects thus would be released and become available for a new arrangement within a new meaning context. Within this new perspective, won in alienation, the chandeliers no longer would bear a special relationship to the spectacle that they illuminated. From this new vantage point and this new grasp of the situation, it no longer mattered that these swinging entities were lamps at all. At the moment of discovery, Galileo already had removed himself from a sacred space bound together by a traditional theme as he came to embody and inhabit the new space of the laboratory, which is governed by a new relationship with the surrounding world, which offers a different grasp of it, and which manifests in consequence different expectations, different regularities, and lawful relationships.

It is said that, following his discovery in the Cathedral, Galileo went home to experiment there with varying abstract replicas of the Cathedral chandeliers. Thus came into being the first prototype of the pendulum that in its regular swing to and fro was to beat the time for countless succeeding generations. And this transformation from ornate chandelier to pendulum took place gradually over the span of many years. As late as 1641, one year before his death, Galileo still thought about how he might apply the motion of a pendulum to a clock. And this transformation had kept pace with the gradual development of the space of the laboratory. But the new laboratory space, which Galileo

progressively embodied and inhabited, can be seen to have been sketched out in all details in the stance he took many years before in the Cathedral of Pisa. It was this space of the laboratory, opened up in this first stance that gave him access to the natural scientific world.

In some strange sense the entire sad conflict between Galileo and the dominant religious culture of his time appears to be foreshadowed in this fateful movement early in his career, when for a brief span he stepped outside the Cathedral to embody and inhabit this new space of the laboratory. **In** this fateful move from one privileged place of revelation to another is contained the struggle that engulfed the larger part of his life and which continues to polarize, often unwittingly, our own. And if we take a larger view, it would appear that Galileo repeated the fateful move of Socrates when the latter withdrew from the space of the theater, with its own characteristic reach and its own access to the world, to come to inhabit with his friends a new domain of philosophical discussions. Thus a new dance was elaborated, a new possibility for embodiment and inhabitation was seized upon and developed, and a new place of privileged contact with the natural and social world had come into being.

Concerning the Natural Scientific Theoria

It might be difficult to see at first glance a connection between the particular steps taken by Galileo in the Cathedral of Pisa and the development of a natural scientific psychology during the latter part of the nineteenth century. To allow for a perspective wherein such a relationship might become visible, we will have to place the Galilean effort within a larger framework in which are included the earliest theoretic efforts. Only

such a larger view will give us the context within which we can come to understand the laboratory as a specific form of theoretic embodiment. We propose to understand the laboratory neither as a finished material thing nor as an eternal idea but rather as a particular manner of a bodily taking up of one's world. The laboratory as embodied movement, as a particular style of inhabitation, permits a certain grasp of the world that is systematically explored within the different experimental sciences. The scientific *theoria*, which moves from the polis to the laboratory, is not a species of movement entirely *sui generis*. We have already pointed out many of the similarities between the ancient religious *theorias* and their modern scientific counterparts. All theoretic efforts should be viewed within the pattern of a journey reaching from the habitual, domesticated realm of everyday, toward a place of privileged contact with the real, ending in an interpretive return to the polis, to the life of everyday. Neither the shrine nor the distant temple nor the modern laboratory are suitable for permanent inhabitation.

It would appear that both Copernicus and Kepler were aware at some level of the continuity between their theoretic efforts and that of their ancient religious predecessors. Copernicus mentions in *De Revolutionibus* that Tremegistes had called the sun "the visible God" and that Sophocles had spoken in *Electra* of the sun as the "all-seer." He further speaks himself of the object of his *theoria* as "seated on his royal throne, surveying his family of planets as they circle round him (Burt, 1932). Kepler had spoken in an even more effusive manner of the sun as "the one, who alone appears, by virtue of his dignity and power, suited for this motive duty and worthy to become the home of God himself" (p. 59).

Such language, however, should not misguide us to overlook the important differences

that separate the new scientific *theoria*, which is embodied in the laboratory, from the traditional religious journeys of ancient Greece.

First of all to be noted is the radicalism of the modern scientific *theoria* as it puts its sight from the start on regions beyond the inhabited or inhabitable world. The ancient journeys always envisioned as their object a recognized shrine, a known dwelling place of a god. They were undertaken to create a living link between man and the gods—the mundane realm and its festive counterpart. In essence these ritual

journeys served the function of making possible a dialogue between a place inhabited by a god and a place inhabited by man. In contrast the newer scientific *theorias* appear to seek to establish a link between the inhabited world and something radically and ultimately beyond it. Moreover, this link is not embodied horizontally as an ongoing conversation between possibly unequal yet commensurate beings; it is lived vertically as a relationship of foundation. At the high point of these modern *theorias* we invariably are rewarded with a vision of a sure foundation, an absolute point of anchorage, a definitive origin capable of supporting the entire weight of creation. The classical *theoria* had been undertaken to find the face and voice of those realities and beings that silently support our daily life; the object of the journey had been to witness a manifestation, to hear a word, to interpret a sign. Where the older *theoria* found a face and an expression, the modern *theoria* found a foothold and a foundation for further journeys. Already Archimedes

had proposed a far-flung *theoria* to the very limits of the earth to contemplate from there an extramundane foothold, on which he hoped to place his levers. "Give me a place to stand beyond the earth," he had boasted to Hiero, "and I will move the earth."

The Archimedean *theoria* proposed to approach not a god but an extraterrestrial place of infinite stability in respect to which the earth itself would become a moving object.

Within this theoretic journey we already find the announcement of the future scientific theme of an extraterrestrial standpoint and origin. Already with Archimedes we see the progressive embodiment of a strange new *physis* without face or voice, whose sole reason for being would be to serve as the future origin and as the future place of anchorage for the body, the home, and the polis. Within this context the laboratory makes its appearance as the embodied endpoint of a theoretic journey to the edge of the inhabited world, from where it permits an outlook on a place of ultimate stability, of origin and foundation. Where Archimedes envisioned a place of anchorage for his levers, Copernicus would find a stable center around which the earth itself could move within its orbit. And Western theoretic effort would turn toward a primal matter that, while it would remain itself indifferent to life, would be neither inhabited nor inhabitable, nevertheless it could be understood as a substrate to all meaning and as a foundation to all life. Within this new journey obsessed with stability, everything would be set into motion. The polis, together with all that it contained and all that it made possible would become itself a moving object. All would be matter in orbit, protoplasm in evolution, spinning round a core of uninhabited and uninhabitable *physis*.

Concerning Festive and Mundane Inhabitation

How are we to understand this new reliance on an ultimate, extraterrestrial, uninhabited, and uninhabitable foothold that nevertheless is assigned the burden of supporting the

weight of all the known and unknown worlds? Certainly we make some progress when we understand the Copernican, or perhaps even the Archimedean, revolution as the abandonment of the classical and the medieval conception of the cosmos and its replacement by an entirely different conception. The classical conception had envisioned the cosmos as divided into two incommensurate parts—the earth and the heavens—each subject to their own lawfulness and therefore the actual potential subject matter for a different physics. It is as if within this modern revolution, two instincts and hierarchically arranged places, each governed by their own laws, collapse into one uniform, indefinitely expanded space. Thus it became possible to elaborate a physics on the basis of astronomical problems and to come to view the earth from diverse extraterrestrial standpoints (Koyre, 1943).

But this revolution asks to be understood within the present context not as a chapter in the history of ideas but as a new manner of *theoretic inhabitation*, that is, as a suggestive new manner of living one's life, of inhabiting the earth, of living the concrete possibilities of the body. Copernicus and Galileo came to take up a new stance, acquired a new grasp of the world, of their fellow citizens and of themselves. It is this grasp that needs to be illuminated and shown forth.

But here we encounter the first of many paradoxes. It appears from all evidence that the grasp and reach of the natural sciences cannot be fully illuminated from within its own domain. We may enter the laboratory, come to inhabit the perspectives of natural science, and thus enter within the grasp of science, allow it to act through us and to give us access to new and distant regions. But in so doing, in enacting the scientific stance, we will not gain access to this stance itself. This reach and grasp, this view of the world

can serve us within the world of science but it cannot reveal itself there.

The self-showing of a gesture, of a stance or an emotion inherently belongs to the festive realm; it pertains to the rites of celebration, to the world of masks, faces, expression. The scientific *theoria* remains, despite its often quite exotic appearances, firmly entrenched within the world of work. Seen within this light, the great transformation brought about by the Copernican revolution is the momentous shift from a festive, celebrative, and essentially expressive *theoria* to a natural scientific *theoria* that remained firmly within the grip of the world of work.

It would be feasible, so it appears, to view the entire history of the Western *theoria* from this perspective in terms of a progressive loss of the dimension of festive inhabitation and of the gradual narrowing of a difference between the world of work and the world of show and manifestation. Within this history is contained a gradual displacement away from the festive place, the temple, the sacred site, the theater even the after dinner party, in the direction of the marketplace, the shop, the office, the bureau of statistics.

Certainly the oldest theorists cannot be thought in isolation from the festive realm since it was precisely their function to create a link between the distant shrine and the workaday world of the polis. And we recall Socrates, the way Appolodorus found him before leaving for his discussions at Agathon's house. He reports that he found the great sage freshly bathed, dressed in new sandals, and generally spruced up for a decidedly festive occasion (Plato, *Symposium*). We find remnants of this festive attitude in Keppler's poems or in Copernicus' hyperbole when he speaks of the sun. It is as if for a moment these theorists forget that they are addressing an abstract

foundation, a mere scientific foothold. Instead they seem to revert back to an older and established stance, to that festive attitude that always seeks a face that forever seeks to evoke an expression by means of expression.

Perhaps we may equally count among the remnants of an older festive attitude the strange lapses in Galileo's memory that obscured for him Kepler's elliptical path of the earth around the sun so that he could substitute for it a perfectly circular path (Panofsky, 1954). This lapse, which has puzzled so many of his biographers, becomes somewhat more intelligible if we realize the close association between the perfect circle and the world of the festive. From the circle issues the perfection of a crystallized path that, precisely in its perfect execution, in its complete victory over all the mundane obstacles that it has found in its way, becomes radiant and shows itself. Imperfect and irregular movements refer us to their aims and purposes, to their struggle for survival, to their daily cares. These movements submerge themselves in their utility. The perfect circle, the perfectly executed movement, lifts itself from its functional context to offer itself to view, to become itself a festive spectacle. Galileo's reluctance to make the earth describe a path less perfect than that of a circle speaks covertly of the older, festive

theoria, of the primacy of a festive showing over a workaday reliance on anchorage and foundation. Perhaps when we strain our ears we can hear in this reticence the voice of Galileo's master, Archimedes, who, at the moment when he was being run through by the sword of a Roman soldier, pleaded with him not to disturb his circles. For both these almost modern theorists the circle was still more than a tool or a concept, more than a mere stepping stone in the endless labor of calculation. It

retained throughout something of the numinous and therefore of the festive.

Kerenyi (1961), in an excellent article about the feast, has drawn attention to the manner in which the festive reveals the meaning of workaday existence, how it reveals the essence of all those very activities and objects that usually remain hidden to the habitual life of everyday. He mentions Attic comedy as an example of such festive transformation in which common everyday life returns to us as spectacle, as worthy of approach, as deserving celebration and festive understanding.

Festive embodiment can most generally be understood as an upwelling and uprising of all that which functions as support for our life. Festivity frees a disciplined body that in the world of work has quietly supported our tasks. Under its influence our footsteps emerge from their self-effacing duties and come to show themselves in a dance. Our functional voices, which have buried themselves in our task-oriented speaking, in our commands and queries, now show themselves in song. Our very language, which we do not hear while we command or listen to instructions, now manifests itself as verse, in puns, in regional tales with amusing accents, in recalled conversations. And in the paintings of Breughel we see the tools that support the farm life of his time displayed upon the walls at the time of celebration.

The festive is the reversal of the embodiment of work that made possible the silent foundations, the contained, anonymous actions, the disciplined body, the self-effacing language, the grain stored in the barn, and the wine kept in the cellar. The festive allows enthusiasm to bubble over; it makes memories rise to the surface, it uncorks bottles, and it opens the cellars and storage rooms. Festive embodiment is itself this contagious

showing forth in person. And in response everything comes to the surface, becomes available, and creates abundance. Festive embodiment seeks the flesh, the substance, the voices, and the faces of the world; it gives substance and life to the Muses; it builds the festive habits and habitats, the shrines and temples, and the procession where what is real and what is true can show itself in person.

The shift from the ancient and modern *theoria* has thus far been understood as a transition from a festive to a workaday manner of revealing the world. We might speak here also of a shift away from an expressive world dominated by face and voice and a move toward a foundational world where the main concern is that of acquiring and maintaining support. The working body is precisely the body that offers itself as silent foundation, as a quiet anonymous resource for the tasks at hand. Only a body stilled of memories, of hunger, of clamoring needs or desires can fully assume the working stance. Only a body that transforms itself into a willing and disciplined instrument can find access to the world of work. As we have seen before, the first work is itself the domestication of a spontaneous body. It is the building of an embodied foundation ready to support the disciplined actions that make possible the human world. The first work is a mastery of movements, the shaping of habits, which in turn can form the basis for subsequent habits. It is at the same time the acquisition of tools, which in their turn can serve as ground for further tools. And the world revealed in labor is equally a resource, is itself a sturdy untamed body that requires to be harnessed, that needs to be taught to walk silently its burdens. Work transforms a surrounding world into a basis, giving access to a wider domain. Tasks lead unceasingly to other tasks. In the world of work, actions become ground for further actions, tools be

come bases of support for further tools, bodies come to support subsequent bodies. This world of work opens at its farthest horizon on a vision of absolute support, of unceasing supplies, of an unflinching grip and foothold. The deepest and widest desire of the embodiment of work is to find ultimate support. The natural scientific *theoria* nursed in the heart of the city by the outlook of practical men and women and inhabiting the perspective of work knows of no other absolute than that of foundation.

Thus a strange new paradox comes into view: the most radical appearing *theoria*, which seeks to penetrate to the farthest reaches of the universe, is also the one that remains most closely tied to the ordinary daily perspectives and concerns of the polis. What may appear from one perspective as a most revolutionary departure from workaday life appears within another as a permanent encampment within the outlook and values of the same workaday life.

It is therefore not at all surprising that the modern theorist, walking in the footsteps of Archimedes, Copernicus, and Galileo, invariably defines his theoretic journey as a kind of work and that he speaks of his place of privileged contact with the real as a place to labor, as a *laboratorium*. The ancient places of worship, of festive manifestation, thus have given way to the giant modern temples of secular worship where the dream is nurtured that all of reality will yield to the grip of industrious hands, that everything can be within reach of vigorous strides.

The Laboratory and Natural Scientific Psychology

If we now move our perspective from the theoretic efforts of Galileo to the work of those nineteenth century psycho physicists who sought to approach the psychological realm

from within the embodiment of the laboratory, we find that in this instance, too, the natural scientific *theoria*, despite its appearance to contrary, remained firmly entrenched within the attitudes and values of the workshop, the factory, and the marketplace. From its inception natural scientific psychology appeared interested above all in the performance of an organism, in its ability to accomplish intellectual, perceptive, and sensory tasks. This science asked how the human organism might find access to its surrounding world; it wished to determine the exact number and the properties of the sensory organs. It sought to know how the human organism could come to conclusions concerning the relative weight, size, luminosity, and temperature of one thing as compared to another, how it went about its task of judging, sensing, perceiving the environment. Wherever we look we find the new experimental science in hot pursuit of a working organism while it is laboring to see and straining to make the right judgments and comparisons. This young science sought to follow its subjects on their daily rounds while accomplishing the basic and unending tasks that need to be accomplished to ensure survival and to make possible a degree of comfort through the reduction of constantly mounting tensions.

These investigations of the working habits of organisms found their natural extension in the investigation of the working habits of industrial workers. The observations of industrial engineers such as F. W. Taylor and Gilbreth on the Pennsylvania steel workers and the English brick layers, respectively, can be scarcely distinguished in method and spirit from the work of the early physiologist and psycho physicists (Eysenck, 1953). There always has been a more or less unobstructed road leading from the modern laboratory to modern industry and the psychological laboratory proved in this respect no

exception (Kvale, 1972).

Modern advertisement techniques certainly bear the heavy imprint of the psychological laboratory and cannot be thought independent from it. Moreover, experimental psychology made eventually possible those instruments of measurement that proved to be of such value in selecting personnel for the armed forces, for industry, and for the educational establishment. Our overall impression of the early work in the psychophysiological laboratory is that, no matter how impractical and otherworldly it may appear at first glance, it nevertheless shows itself as essentially allied to the realities of a surrounding workaday civilization.

Thus it would appear that Western academic psychology had its start in the world as a systematic investigation of the workaday realities of organs and organisms. The path of this psychology leads directly to the investigation of the capacities of workers, the preferences of buyers, the reasoning abilities of children. This psychology brought us the intelligence test, the work preference records, the time and motion studies, the efficiency reports, the teaching machines, the speed reading programs, the biofeedback gadgets. It designed instrument panels and made recommendations concerning traffic lights; it assisted in advertising and public relations programs and became active in personnel selection and motivation. This psychology remains active to this day and continues to offer its often valuable services in all those areas of life that lend themselves readily to being approached as daytime tasks and as such prove amenable to rational solution and management.

The Consulting Room as the Site of Psychoanalysis

If now we turn our attention from the laboratory to the psychoanalytic consulting room of Freud, we are again confronted with the problem of embodiment and dwelling, that is, with the interpretation of a place as a giver of access to a world. Once more we will try to approach the site of psychoanalysis as we have approached the site of the natural sciences, that is, not as a mere material container of immaterial thoughts or ideas but rather as the embodiment of a certain grasp and a certain view of the world. Psychoanalysis as a theoretic discipline is itself the unfolding of this grasp and this view in an interpretive return from the consulting room to the polis. Psychoanalytic writings constitute the festive return of the theorists to the daily concerns and workaday realities of the polis. These writings always speak about what was seen and heard and understood at the apogee of the theoretic journey. They always refer to what transpired in the psychoanalytic consulting room, to what became audible, visible, and tangible from there. Within the present context the consulting room makes its appearance at the apogee of a theoretic journey and as the embodiment of an original theoretic stance.

At the beginning of this essay we attempted to point out how the achievement of a repeatable bodily stance could be viewed as itself already an architectonic accomplishment, as already a form of building and of dwelling. We must now attempt to view this achievement of a bodily attitude in its relationship to that of a written text so that it will become possible to view psychoanalysis all at once in terms of the architectonics of a consulting room, of prescribed bodily stances such as reclining on a couch or sitting on a chair, and of a series of texts.

We have taken the word "stance" as the beginning point of our reflections on the

site of theorizing, and this choice appears to be a particularly fortunate one. Placed within the context of a group of closely related words, all of which are built around the Indo-European base *sTA*, we see open up before us a field of significance in which it becomes possible to view bodily attitude, architectural structure, and written text—all as closely related aspects of a meaningful whole.

An important member of this linguistic group is the Greek *histemi*, which refers both to a standing upright, and therefore to a bodily attitude, as well as to a causing to stand upright, and thus to a primitive form of building. The architectural reference is particularly strong in the substantive form *hestia* for hearth and home. Used as a proper noun, this same word and its closely related Latinized form *vesta* names the daughter of Rhea and Cronos, protectors of the hearth. The Latin *stare* repeats the reference of the Greek *histemi* to both a transitive and intransitive standing. Closely related forms refer to bodily attitudes (the Latin *statura*) or to social standing (the Latin *status*) as well as to sculpting (*statue*), to the building or formation of a nation (*state*), or of a city (the German *stadt*), of a building (*station*) or of a room (the Italian *stanza*). We find references to texts in such related words as the literary "STANZA" or the legal "STATUTE." In a statute, a legal body, a person or a collectivity takes a stand. Something is asked to be understood, some thing is put forth, made to stand up in court, placed before the public, made to stand for something or someone and inviting others to take a stand.

A poetic "STANZA" is a coherent fragment of a poem; it functions as an inhabitable subdivision of a larger whole, as a room in a larger house. And we need not to be reminded here how a poem is eminently something built and something asking to be

inhabited. All these interrelated words together introduce us to a context where something definite emerges from the flux, something stands up or stands out, something definite inserts itself into the life of a community so that it comes to exert an influence of its own, so that it demands a stance in its turn and causes other influences to stand up or fall down. Something is brought to the fore, something definite announces itself in such a manner that it offers resistance to those who would treat it as an obstacle, while offering hospitality to those who would seek to dwell within. We see here emerge the possibility of treating a text not only as stance but as architecture, that is, as inhabitable structure. And within this same context the art of literary interpretation shows itself as the art of inhabiting a text. Interpretation in general becomes here a reflection on how we move from one site to the other, from one manner of embodiment to another, from one painting or text or building to another.

It is to be understood that the inhabitation of any text or any architectural whole inherently requires a relationship to other texts or buildings. *Stance* is not *rigor mortis*, but congealed movement, stilled attitude that orders movement into an inhabitable structure in the same way that in music silences link and situates all sound. Every building stands between other buildings as every text neighbors others. Moreover, texts should not ultimately be viewed apart from the larger architectural whole to which they belong. Texts belong to particular sites where they repeat in their own idiom the manner of standing inherent in a larger inhabitable whole. Texts can be approached as furthering and realizing in their own manner a more encompassing architecture.

It is possible, of course, to remove texts from their sites, to study psychoanalytic texts apart from the consulting room or to understand a text on chemistry outside the context of a natural scientific laboratory as a self-revelation of an unsituated eternal truth. And in a similar manner it is possible to view the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum and apart from their original setting within and around the Parthenon. We may thus work toward the individuation of marbles, canvasses, and texts and may view interpretation as the attempt to achieve an ultimate independence of each individual thing in its own right. But a relentless pursuit in that direction ends with the work of art or the text finally becoming so disembodied and uninhabitable that it no longer invites us to take a stance in respect to it. What once had stood before us in mysterious hospitality now will have lost all kinship with mortal living bodies and come to float above our heads and evaporate away. All this should warn us not to interpret the Freudian texts in isolation from the consulting room or to make the mistake of undertaking the idealist leap from the texts to a kind of eternal anthropology.

Interpretation requires that text, site and stance each are allowed. to evoke the other so that together they can create a living, inhabitable whole. Freud's demand that the patient and the analyst each assume a definite stance in analytic therapy should therefore not be treated as unrelated to the psychoanalytic texts or as merely marginally related to it. Psychoanalysis becomes incomprehensible as soon as we forget the half-reclined stance of the patient and that of the therapist as seated behind the patient at the head of the couch in an attitude of evenly hovering attentiveness. Text, chair, and couch all invite us to a particular kind of embodiment, to a particular manner of inhabiting, and to a certain way of understanding.

If we now attempt to describe the psychoanalytic consulting room as a site of theoretic inhabitation, that is, as apogee of a theoretic journey, we must at first attempt to situate it among other such sites. And if we seek to place the consulting room in relation to the laboratory, as it has evolved in psychological research, we notice first of all how it remains consistently removed from the active concerns of every day.

Unlike the laboratory, the psychoanalytic consulting room does not immediately connect with the army recruiting office, with the factory and the advertising agency. It appears situated outside the busy daytime world where definite tasks constantly demand attention, where we are drawn from one practical assignment to the next. This new site strangely draws toward the night, toward the world of sleep and

dreams, of affections, of desires and passions, even of demons, angels, . and visions.

As first approach to this strange new inhabitation, we might situate it between the daytime world of never-ending, practical involvements and the nighttime world of passionate transports of sleep and unconsciousness. From this perspective, the world of psychoanalysis would belong to the time between day and night, to a world of dusk and dawn, to the time between lying down in bed and sitting up at our desk or standing up to do our daily chores. Psychoanalysis essentially would privilege a new embodiment between sleep and work. It would position us between lying down and sitting up, and from that new, ambiguous embodiment invite us to further inhabit the world. The analyst would draw us into conversation from that perspective, ask us to address our situation from there and thus to elaborate a new access to the surrounding world, to the self, and to others.

The reclined stance of the patient as well as the seated stance of the therapist,

prominent and essential as these are in psychoanalysis, should for that fact not be thought of as limited to the psychoanalytic domain or as having no comparable role to play in the larger cultural context from which they are derived. Our reflection on *stance* should on the contrary make it possible to relate the architecture of the consulting room to a larger, cultural world. It should become possible, for example, to relate the reclining Freudian patient to the painterly tradition of the reclining nude. We find evidence of that tradition as far back as the frescoes of Pompeii, and we can follow it through Giorgione, Ingres, and Coxa up to Manet, Modigliani, and Matisse. These nudes invariably make their appearance within a context in which the boundaries of human life are touched; they evoke within a space delimited by revelation and impenetrable mystery the themes of sexuality, birth, and death.

The pensive, seated, attentively listening figure of the analyst is equally abundantly present in Western art. Examples of such artists as Michelangelo, Blake, or Rodin come most readily to mind. Michelangelo represents both stances in relationship to one another in the elaborate tomb he built for the Medici family in the chapel adjoining the San Lorenzo in Florence. A closer look at this complex work should prove to be not without interest for an understanding of psychoanalysis. The tomb consists today of a complement of seven major pieces by the hand of the master, all of them originally conceived as part of a much more ambitious and extensive project. Yet, even so, these figures form together a unity in which each part sustains and defines all the others.

Guiliano's tomb is watched over by two languid figures - those of Night and Day. The tomb of Lorenzo is adorned with the figures of Dawn, or *Aurora*, and Dusk, or

Crepuscolo. The seated figures of the Dukes appear to preside over the scene, while the figure of a Madonna and Child at the adjacent wall provides this somber and enclosed world with a horizon of hope for a new life to come.

If we enter this scene from the perspective of the psychoanalytic consulting room and with our attention focused on the patient, we feel immediately attracted to the figure of Dawn, to her gentle upward movement, to her awakening and her reaching for the light. We might be tempted to view either the psychoanalytic patient or this marble goddess in isolation, as a pure, rising *aurora*, as an embodied upward striving that leads from sleep and dreams to a progressively clearer understanding, and from there to proper functioning and to work.

But such a view, tempting as it might be in its simplicity, would violate both figures by removing them from the proper context wherein alone they can come to achieve their definition.

Michelangelo's *Aurora* takes her place among the other figures of composition, just as the psychoanalytic patient eventually comes to situate herself in respect to the analyst, to the body of psychoanalytic writings, to the couch and the other furnishings of the room, in short, to all that which clings to the theoretic journey in which she is engaged. We therefore cannot arbitrarily isolate our figure from among many; nor will it enhance our understanding if we were to exclusively focus on the upward movement of awakening and thereby permanently isolate it from the rest. Each figure and each movement must be seen in concert with all others. Each figure and each aspect of the works of Michelangelo and Freud points to a larger and a dynamic context, and it is this context that is the birthplace of these figures and the place or origin of all their movements. Each figure

and each movement elaborates this context, sings of it or dies within it, promotes it and gives substance to it.

Aurora, as the inclination toward the light and to consciousness, as emancipating chiaroscuro cannot achieve definition outside the context of the figure of *Crepuscolo*, or Dusk. The upward trend forever speaks of the chiaroscuro of decline, of drifting off to sleep or into death. And neither should these two figures-who define and sustain one another while their paths cross and intertwine - be perceived in isolation from the pensive figure of the Duke, who from his lonely height and from his distance appears to reflect deeply on the scene. If we follow the oblique and meditative glance of the Duke, we come to discover yet another aspect of the situation and perceive, across the hall, the figure of a radiant Madonna and her Child. Moreover all these figures, who can be felt to interact with one another, appear in addition suffused with a sad awareness of the passing of time and the inevitability of death. None of their gestures or glances allows us to stray too far from the stark reality of the sarcophagi or from the earth below. The upward move to consciousness, to awakening, to thoughtfulness and eternal life is thereby forever complemented by the downward read toward the dead and toward the earth. Neither Michelangelo nor Freud allows us to reach for an Eros in isolation from a Thanatos.

The resemblance between the ambiance of these sculptures and the ambiance of psychoanalysis does not stop at this mutual reference of each part to all others or at the particular attitudes assumed by the main figures that together create the respective dramas. Stand in amidst these magnificent marbles, allowing their stances to work in on us, we are ourselves drawn into a strange fertile twilight, toward a place where the paths

of life and death, of consciousness and unconsciousness, of night and day, appear to cross and intertwine. Drawn inward by the play of the Muses we find ourselves within a strange originary landscape, a country of origins where nothing as yet is sharply confronted or completely defined. No definite path has as yet been taken, and we stand as if at the time of the beginning of the world. Here we feel obliquely present to all that the world may hold, without either having something definitely within our grasp or yet feeling anything as definitely beyond it.

This is how as a patient we come to inhabit the psychoanalytic consulting room. We awaken to a kind of promising twilight; we are aroused by a strangely pensive evocative presence. We find ourselves within the power of a source of light, of a sun, or of a distant glance that arouses through its diffuseness and pervasiveness rather than by means of any particular focus or interest. Here we are drawn into a diffuse wakefulness that is not as yet attached to any particular task or project, that does not clearly formulate responses to a sharply circumscribed presence. And with this as yet indefinite presence - which situates itself as if suspended between day and night, sleep and wakefulness - a new manner of speaking and a new form of dialogue comes to assert itself. In the daytime world of busy exchanges we want to be understood as quickly and as precisely as we possibly can manage. In that world we seek to have a predictable effect on our environment, we use language as a tool to bring about desirable changes, to make progress in our tasks; we seek to affect people and things in a precise manner. During the night, on the other hand, this active and functional dialogue disappears, and we become enveloped in a darkness and a silence that is at the same time both absolutely private and totally promiscuous.

To enter the psychoanalytic sphere proper, that is, the sphere of psychoanalytic practice, we need to learn a different manner of speaking and of understanding. We are not to fall asleep on the psychoanalytic couch; we are not to withdraw within a private realm of desire or of pain. But neither are we to speak in a proper, upright manner while trying to impress or convince the one to whom we are talking. Within the psychoanalytic enclave, we are to cease all effort at influencing the therapist, at winning him for a friend, at making the right impression. We are not even allowed to calculate the effect of what we are saying, and we are therefore urged to disobey a fundamental rule of daytime, public life, which requires that we think before we speak. Here language conceived as a tool falls from the patient's hands. Here we are encouraged to speak in spite of immediate personal consequences and in the service of another, deeper, more encompassing reality. And here we listen in the role of the analyst without any preconceived idea of what is to be accomplished except in a most global manner. We do not attempt to assess the one we are listening to, do not assign blame or calculate the other's trustworthiness, his moral stature, his or her ability to accomplish particular tasks. Here we listen not with our mind ticking away or with the cash register clinging or with the prospect of possible mutual ventures coming (0 the fore. Here we listen while situated between sleep and wakefulness, while emptied of all busy purposes, with the pit of the stomach rather than with the head or the ears. Here we allow ourselves as listener to be jostled by myriad impressions as an anchored boat is jostled on a lake by the wind and by the waves. In the psychoanalytic hour we thus stay present to one another in maximal receptiveness, in what Freud (1943) termed *gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit*, or evenly distributed attentiveness. Such an attentiveness is yet unselective, is not yet ready to prefer or to

reject one particular action or item over another. As such, it appears peculiarly appropriate to the time of daybreak when we cast a first open, undirected, wandering glance at the world around us.

With psychoanalysis we enter a realm between night and day, between sleeping and waking, lying down and sitting up. We enter there where words have not as yet become fully appropriated, refuse as yet to become fully subservient to our practical purposes. Freud likes the word that has not been fully domesticated, that rebels against conventions and refuses to fit into a pre-established context. He loves the word that slips past the tongue and past the active, conscious, constantly manipulating mind, thereby revealing a world beyond its borders. He loves the rebellious word that in turning against the speaker's conscious designs points to a new manner of dialogue, to a different way of speaking and comprehending oneself and others. The elusive word speaks in the midst of the day concerning a possible dialogue of dusk and dawn.

The great contribution of the psychoanalytic room, of the inhabitation of a world of beginnings and endings, is that it made possible a new form of dialogue. Psychoanalysis is itself this progressive inhabitation and embodiment of an original stance that makes possible a new understanding. From this original stance emerged the first wayward psychoanalytic word that, together with those that followed, broke into an hesitant stream of free associations. And it is in this stream that the nets of myth were plunged to gather a new harvest of meanings. A further elaboration of this harvest gave rise to a web of modern theoretic tales of steam engines, of dams that must resist mounting pressures, or even of spies crossing and re-crossing borders.

The first hesitant word spoken in the world of dawn and dusk, transformed in this

manner, came to inhabit the midst of life, where it entered the clinic as a doctrine concerning the treatment of mental illness. It entered the university as a modern theory of the psyche, of man, of illness or society. But the psychoanalytic stance and the words that emerged from it, never could quite be integrated into this bright world of practical and rational pursuits. Its strength was and remains today precisely this resistance to the appropriative tendencies of commercial and functional life. It continues to live within the workaday world as a perpetual pull toward the periphery. It moves forever, inexorably toward the edge of life, toward the mysteries of suffering and desire, of birth and of death. As such, this stance is a perpetual *momenta mori* in the midst of life. Whatever makes its appearance in the noontime world as absolutely self-evident or self-sufficient, as unchanging, as completely clear and distinct, inevitably is pulled back by the wayward psychoanalytic word into the lengthening shadows of dusk and into the twilight of dawn.

Reading and Writing in Psychoanalysis

What has been said above about Freud and Michelangelo requires that we place the concept of sculpture within a larger context that includes the carving of letters, the composition of texts, or even the achievement of bodily stance. The angle from which we have approached psychoanalysis ultimately requires us to explore the continuities between ballet, sculpture, and the art of writing. It is clear that of all the arts Freud was most strongly attracted to sculpture and architecture. He surrounded himself in his daily life with an astonishing collection of antique art objects, and he frequently spoke of psychoanalysis as a kind of archeology in

search of the material traces of older civilizations. And he thought of these traces as a kind of writing that needed to be deciphered.

If we proceed to understand writing, like sculpture, or like the achievement of a bodily stance as a kind of building, it becomes possible to understand reading as a form of inhabitation. If writing can be understood as the presentation of a bodily stance then reading appears as the embodiment of a responsive stance. Thus approached, reading and writing are as inseparable from each other as are building and dwelling; together they form a unity of succeeding, mutually overlapping, responsive stances. Reading and writing ultimately show themselves as modalities of inhabitation and embodiment.

This view accords with psychoanalysis, where reading and writing always refer us back to the human body and its primordial gestures. Within that discipline, movement can be understood only as gesture. Even understanding means here to gesture in response to gesture. The entire edifice of civilization is understood here as a precarious bodily building, as based on the upright posture, as a standing up to, or a standing out from, an engulfing nature. And once afoot, this civilizing stance achieves its definition by means of a creative gesture of denial in response to a natural given. This gesture of denial in turn creates the clearing for a city and a stage on which can appear all the affirmative stances that form the substance of civilization. Civilization in its foundation as well as in its contours is bodily stance through and through. Behind all texts, according them their coherence, lies, sits, stands the human body.

This is not to suggest, however, that psychoanalysis presents us with a unitary conception of writing and reading. In general we can point to two quite divergent styles of reading that occupy an equally prominent place in psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Perhaps the most familiar style of reading is exemplified by Oedipus as he confronts the Sphinx on his way to Thebes. Freud kept a reproduction of Ingres' painting of that scene within his range of vision while listening to his patients. The manner of this Oedipal reading of the riddle of the Sphinx accords with the general style of Oedipus' actions, with the murder of his father and the amorous conquest of his mother. This reading breaks through an obstacle toward a desired goal. Oedipus answers the constraining riddle; he kills the Sphinx and gains an unfettered freedom. His gestures overcome and annihilate the gestures of another. Such reading ultimately invalidates the material traces presented by the carved image, by the sculpture, the stone Sphinx, or the bodily stance. It explodes a material surface experienced as restraining and thwarting; it opposes and conquers the obstacle of a signifier on the way to the signified. Such reading presents us with the drama of an immaterial intelligence seeking deliverance from a material encumbrance of a spirit or rationality breaking through a stranglehold of an oppressive gesture toward an infinite freedom. Oedipus' reading leaves the text an empty, impotent shell, deprived of all further powers to entrap rationality and freedom.

Psychoanalysis can be understood in part as such a destructive reading of riddles posed to us by our history. Therapy is the confrontation of the Sphinx, and a proper understanding of our symptoms will explode the obstacles and clear the way to Thebes. But at Thebes there awaits us a fate that no longer can be read in the youthful destructive ways of the intrepid Oedipus. Here the reading of the text of our fate means also the living of our life. Beyond the road that we clear with our ingenuity, our will and industry, we confront our history not as an obstacle that must be removed but as an imperial gesture that we complete with our life. In this realm Freud no longer faces the

Sphinx but rather stands before the great Moses of Michelangelo.

Here we confront a gesture and a text with the plea to be welcomed, with the desire to be let in and allowed to inhabit a mysterious or enchanting place. Here we are lovers waiting before the gate that can be opened only from the inside. It is in this attitude that Freud originally approaches the great Moses of the St. Pietro di Vincoli. In a letter to Eduardo Weisz dated from 1933, he recounts how "for three solitary weeks I stood daily in the church before the statute, studied, measured, drew it till I came to an understanding that at first I dared to express only anonymously." At another place he speaks movingly of the sculpture as a text in which he discovers ambiguities that require resolution. But this resolution is, again, not achieved in a power play, by means of some flashy trick of the intelligence, by a clever strategy, the answering of a riddle. He tells us rather how he stood before the Moses and awaited the unfolding of a gesture. It is in this attitude that the Duke Lorenzo appears to be awaiting the passing of the gentle sleep around him. And it is in this same patient untroubled but nevertheless expectant attitude that the analyst awaits the stirring of a new life on the couch. Reading the sculpture, analyzing the patient means here the patient awaiting of the unfolding of an ambiguous gesture. Seen within this light Freud's essay on Moses is not merely the product of an Oedipal intrepid, irreverent, and revolutionary reading of the great prophet. It is itself a gesture that seeks to draw out further the gestures of the great marble.

There exists within psychoanalysis a tension between this contemplative stance and the intrepid one, between an evenly hovering attentiveness and a bold incisive reading of hidden meanings, between a standing before Moses and a confrontation with the Sphinx.

This tension leads us to the very heart of psychoanalysis. Here we discover that

beyond the Sphinx, whom we may conquer, there lies Thebes where we must live our fateful history. Beyond the world of neurotic constrictions we discover a world of fatefulness that cannot be evaded with clever gestures but requires to be lived in accordance with an unfolding lawfulness. To read this law means to discern the dimensions of our life, to see rise up before us its limits, and from there its possibilities. Psychoanalysis cannot end with the solving of riddles. Beyond the fireworks of an Oedipal destructive reading, which is a necessary breaking of bonds, a leaving of the parental home, a revolution, we discern the necessity for a contemplative reading, which is an orienting of ourselves to the forces of our life, a homecoming to our fate. Such a *fateful*, contemplative reading makes possible a homecoming to our life and thereby lays the foundation for a truly inhabitable world. To not discover Moses after passing the Sphinx means to have lost the way and to have lost the land and the life of our promise.

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